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Japan has seen episodes in which boom and bust in land prices is accompanied by boom and bust
in business fixed investment. We develop a model that includes land in the production function. We
show that in this model movements in land prices will be associated with movements of the capital
stock in the same direction, provided the elasticity of substitution between land and capital is greater
than one. We then estimate an aggregate investment function. Consistent with an elasticity greater
than one, increases in land prices are associated with increases in the business capital stock even
after controlling for movements in output and the cost of capital; decreases have a symmetric effect.
In the end, however, we find that movements in land prices explain relatively little of the movement
in the business fixed investment. In addition to possibly indicating that the elasticity is very near one,
the small effect may result because of difficulty in extracting information from noisy land prices,
neglect of the effects of regulations, and failure to consider credit constraints.
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Japan has seen episodes in which boom and bust in land prices is
accompanied by boom and bust in business fixed investment.  This occurred in
the late 1980s and the early 1970s.  In this paper we formally model the link
between movements in land prices and in business investment, and use
regressions to quantify the importance of the link.  In the end, however, our
estimates attribute relatively little of the movement in business fixed
investment to movements in land prices.
Our model attempts to formalize the following intuition: when land
prices rise due to (say) an increase in aggregate productivity, individual
price-taking firms will try to economize on land by building taller structures
and using more compact capital equipment. That is, all things equal, a rise in
land prices will cause firms shift towards technologies with higher ratios of
capital to land.  While our focus is on the behavior of a representative price
taking firm, we note that a similar shift may hold in the aggregate: in a
class of growth models, an increase in aggregate productivity causes an
increase in the aggregate capital-output ratio when the elasticity of
substitution between capital and land that is larger than one.  That is, a
rise in productivity will encourage business fixed investment above and beyond
the usual direct effects through the cost of capital and output.  A fall in
aggregate productivity will have the opposite consequence.
To formalize our analysis of the link between land prices and
investment, we work in the vein of the neoclassical investment model pioneered
by Hall and Jorgenson (1967).  We build in particular on our own work
(Kiyotaki and West (1996)).  We posit a dynamic model in which there are costs
to adjusting capital.  We depart from earlier work by assuming that land is a
third factor of production, along with labor and capital.  Land and capital
enter the production function as a constant elasticity of substitution
composite, with an elasticity that may not be one.
We log-linearize the first order conditions for the model.  The
resulting expression for target capital generalizes in a natural way the2
target posited by Hall and Jorgenson: the "user cost of land" joins output and
the user cost of capital as determinants of target capital.  Here, the "user
cost of land" adjusts land prices for taxes and the firm's opportunity cost of
funds.  If one abstracts from costs of adjustment, the decision rule has
characteristics familiar from basic microeconomics: ceteris paribus, increases
in the user cost of land will lead to increases in capital if and only if the
elasticity of substitution is greater than one.  In our dynamic model, which
has costs of adjustment, the increase in capital takes the form of a long run
response to a permanent increase in the user cost of land.
We do not directly estimate the elasticity of substitution in our
empirical work.  But a calibration yields a positive value for a certain
related parameter that is positive if and only if the elasticity is greater
than one.  The elasticity of substitution between land and capital exceeding
one is also consistent with the stylized observation that the share of land in
tangible assets has been declining over time in many developed countries
(Eaton (1988,p77)).
Using the calibrated value, we estimate the decision rule implied by our
model, using annual capital stock data for non-financial corporations during
the period 1961-95.  We find estimates of the land-capital relationship that
are plausible.  Increases in the user cost of land do cause increases in
capital.  Moreover, estimates of the decision rule are qualitatively similar
whether we estimate it without restrictions or subject to the cross-equation
restrictions implied by our model.  But the quantitative effect of land on
capital growth (on investment) is small.  Mechanically, this appears to be
attributable to the fact that our initial calibration is consistent with an
elasticity only very slightly above 1.  And if the elasticity is exactly one,
our model effectively reduces to a traditional neoclassical model, in which
target capital depends only on output and the user cost of capital.  
The theoretical and empirical results reported here are by no means
definitive. The empirical counterparts to the variables in our model are not
obvious, and standard data sources may not be adequate.  It may be that with3
alternative measures of capital, land, or capital or land prices, our approach
would yield an elasticity much greater than one, and thus suggest a more
important role for land prices.  And regardless of data problems, it is
possible that there is a strong link between land prices and investment that
cannot be modeled without considering frictions of some sort.  One possibility
is regulations, in particular on land use.  A second is credit constraints
(Ogawa et al. (1996), Kiyotaki (1998)). 
It is a great honor for us to contribute this paper to a volume in
memory of Albert Ando.  Albert’s knowledge and advice about Japanese data was
vital to our earlier paper on Japanese investment (Kiyotaki and West (1996)).  
Albert played a somewhat more diffuse but even more important role as friend,
mentor and fellow economist.  Over the years, we discussed and debated topics
ranging from rational expectations to Phillips curves to inventory models. 
One anecdote may illustrate the generous way Albert gave time to younger
economists.  One of us (West) first came in contact with Albert in connection
with a Social Science Research Council grant received as a graduate student. 
Albert was co-chair of the committee that decided the award.  The award
notification included two pages of single spaced set of comments signed by
Albert–and this on a research proposal consisting of five double spaced pages! 
That generosity of spirit was complemented by a keen mind and seemingly
boundless energy. Albert made fundamental contributions to a number of topics
relevant to the present paper, including modeling of business investment
(e.g., Ando et al. (1974)), measuring the cost of capital (e.g., Ando, Hancock
and Sawchuk (1997)), and problems with measurement of Japanese data (e.g.,
Ando (2000) and Ando, Christelis and Miyagawa (2003)).  This and other work by
Albert was theoretically rigorous, policy relevant, and scrupulous with data. 
Our own work may not measure up to the high standard set by Albert’s work. 
But that high standard remains a goal that we both aim to achieve.
Section 2 presents the model.  Section 3 describes our estimation
strategy.  Section 4 describes data.  Section 5 presents empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes.4
2. MODEL
In this section we present the partial equilibrium optimization problem
and loglinear first order conditions that provide the basis for our empirical
work.  Footnote 2 below comments briefly on a general equilibrium version of
our model.
We work in the vein of the neoclassical investment literature of Hall
and Jorgenson (1967) and Abel and Blanchard (1986).  We extend earlier work on
investment to include land as a factor of production, relying in particular on
our own work (Kiyotaki and West (1996)).  The key element of the extension is
a constant returns to scale production function in which output Y t is
Cobb-Douglas in (1)labor Nt, and (2)a composite in capital Kt and land Lt with
constant elasticity of substitution:
(2.1) Yt = F(Nt,Kt,Lt,At)










"/[1-(1/2)], 0<"<1, 2>0, ($0.
In (2.1), At is total factor productivity.  The elasticity of substitution
between capital and land is 2>0; ( is a non-negative parameter.  When 2=1, the
production function reduces to one that is Cobb-Douglas in all three factors;
when (=0 the production function reduces to one that is Cobb-Douglas in
capital and labor.  As we shall see, an elasticity of substitution 2>1 is key
to generating a positive response of capital Kt to a rise in land prices.   In
(2.1) and in other equations below, the variables are real, and are measured
in our empirical work in trillions of 1980 yen.
We assume that the representative competitive firm chooses output and
factor inputs to maximize the expected present discounted value of real cash
flow.  To keep the algebra relatively uncluttered, we abstract from taxes,
although these will be accounted for in our empirical work.  Let W t be the
real wage, It gross investment, Kt the capital stock, # PIt the real price of a
unit of capital, # PLt the real price of a unit of land. (The "~" over the price5
variables is used merely to distinguish them from the nominal price variables
PIt and PLt used in the empirical work.)  the firm’s maximization problem is:




(2.2b) expendituret+j = Wt+jNt+j + # PIt{It+.5N[(Kt/Kt-1)-GK]
2Kt-1} + # PLt(Lt-Lt-1), N$0,
(2.2c) Kt = (1-*)Kt-1+It, 0<*#1.
In (2.2a), output price is numeraire (effected in our empirical work by
using the output price deflator to construct real factor prices).  The term
$t,t+j is a real discount factor, used to discount period t+j values back to
period t.  The firm takes as given sequences of discount factors {$t,t+j} and
factor prices {Wt}, {# PIt} and {# PLt}.
In (2.2b), each of the three factors of production generates a
per-period expenditure.  The first term, Wt+jNt+j, is wage costs.  The term
.5N[(Kt/Kt-1)-GK]
2Kt-1 is the cost of adjusting capital, with N>0 a positive
parameter.  Large costs of adjustment are captured by large values of N. 
These costs attain a minimum around GK, the steady state rate of growth of the
capital stock, and increase as gross investment deviates from its steady state
rate of growth.  See Kiyotaki and West (1996).  In (2.2c), net capital
accumulation is related to gross investment, with *$0 the constant
depreciation rate.  
In (2.2b), the net cost of land acquisition is simply the per unit price
of land multiplied by the net change in land quantity.  (A negative value is
of course possible, and occurs sometimes in our data.)  To prevent confusion,
we note that expenditures on (say) underground connections to sewers or
electrical lines are understood to be part of capital K and do not result in a
change in land L: "capital" is used in the sense of national income and
product accounting, and includes all fixed investment.  Indeed, in the nation
as a whole Lt is essentially fixed.
16
Recall from (2.1) that the production function is "F." For x=N, K or L
let
Fxt / MF/Mxt.
The first order conditions are:
(2.3a) Nt:W t = FNt = (1-")Yt/Nt.




















(2.3c) Kt: # PIt{1+N[(Kt/Kt-1)-GK]} -
Et$t,t+1# PIt+1{1-* + N[(Kt+1/Kt)-GK]GK + .5N[(Kt+1/Kt)-GK]
2} = FKt,
FKt = "(Yt/Kt):t.
The first order condition (2.3a) simply sets the marginal product of labor
equal to the real wage.  As usual, the fact that the production function is
Cobb-Douglas in labor means that the investment equation we derive will not
depend directly on wages Wt or labor Nt, and we shall have nothing more to say
about these variables.
The left hand side of condition (2.3b) is the user cost of land, i.e.,
the cost of acquiring a unit of land this period and selling it next period;
the right hand side is the marginal product of land.  The first term in braces
on the left hand side of (2.3c) is the period t marginal cost of purchasing
and installing an extra unit of capital; the second term is the expected
marginal benefit of selling the undepreciated portion of that unit next
period.  Both terms take into account costs of adjustment.  The right hand
side of (2.3c) is the marginal product of capital.
Our next step is to use (2.3b) and (2.3c) to derive a log-linear first
order condition for capital.  Define the user cost of capital C K and the user
cost of land CL as7
(2.4a) CKt / # PIt-(1-*)Et($t,t+1# PIt+1),
(2.4b) CLt / # PLt-Et($t,t+1# PLt+1).
Next, rewrite (2.3c) as
(2.5) (Kt/Kt-1)-1 = GK-1 + (1/N# PIt)(FKt-CKt) + 
Et$t,t+1(# PIt+1/# PIt){[(Kt+1/Kt)-GK]GK + .5[(Kt+1/Kt)-GK]
2} 
= (GK-1)(1-GKD) + [N
-1-N
-1(1-*)D][(FKt/CKt)-1] + DGKEt[(Kt+1/Kt)-1] + et,
et / N
-1(1-*)(D-EtDt+1)[(FKt/CKt)-1] + GKEt[(Dt+1-D)()Kt+1/Kt - GK+1)] +
.5NEtDt+1[(Kt+1/Kt)-GK]
2,
Dt+1/$t,t+1(# PIt+1/# PIt), 
D/EDt+1.
Observe that all the terms in et are the product of terms with mean zero,
which use as a rationalization for treating et as an unmodeled error term in
our empirical work.  
To apply a log-linear approximation to (2.5), let lowercase letters
denote logarithms of the corresponding uppercase variables:
(2.6) kt / ln(Kt), yt / ln(Yt), cKt / ln(CKt), cLt / ln(CLt), fKt / ln(FKt).
Then (Kt/Kt-1)-1 . )kt.  Since the average value of FKt/CKt-1 is zero, FKt/CKt-1 .
fKt-cKt and (2.5) becomes
(2.7) )kt . constant + [N
-1-N
-1(1-*)D](fKt-cKt) + DGKEt)kt+1 + et.
Finally, we solve for fKt (the log of the marginal product of capital)
in terms of observables.  From the first order condition for land (2.3b) and
the definition of the user cost of land (2.4b), we have C Lt=FLt; since FLt/FKt =8
((Lt/Kt)
-1/2, we have
(2.8) CLt/FKt = ((Lt/Kt)
-1/2 ==> Lt/Kt = ((FKt/CLt)
2.
Observe from (2.3b) that :t = 1/[1+((Lt/Kt)
1-(1/2)].  In light of (2.8), this
means :t = 1/[1+(
2(FKt/CLt)
2-1] ==>
(2.9) FKt = "(Yt/Kt)/[1+(
2(FKt/CLt)
2-1] ==>
fKt = ln" + yt - kt - ln{1+(
2[exp(fKt)/exp(cLt)]
2-1}.
Then taking a first order approximation of ln{1+(
2[exp(fKt)/exp(cLt)]
2-1} gives
(2.10) fKt . deterministic terms + yt - kt - (1-:)(2-1)(fKt-cLt)
. deterministic terms + {1/[1+(1-:)(2-1)]}[yt-kt+(1-:)(2-1)cLt],
where : is the average value of :t, 0<:#1.  In (2.10) the "deterministic
terms" include not only ln(") but also terms that result from evaluation of
ln(:t) at average or trend values of fKt and cLt.  Let
(2.11) 0 / (1-:)(2-1).
The parameter 0 can be thought of as the elasticity of the target capital
stock with respect to the user cost of land.
Substituting (2.10) and (2.11) into (2.7) yields the log-linear equation
(2.12) )kt = a(k
*
t-kt) + bEt)kt+1 + et,
k
*
t / yt - (1+0)cKt + 0cLt = yt - cKt - 0(cKt-cLt),
a / [1-(1-*)D]/[N(1+0)], b / DGK,
where et has been redefined to include the approximation error, and
deterministic terms have been omitted for notational simplicity.  In (2.11) k
*
t9
is the target (log) capital stock (omitting the deterministic term ln(")).
To interpret (2.12), first consider the case in which there are no costs
of adjustment: multiply through by N and then set N=0.  The first order
condition is then kt=k
*
t+(et/a): apart from a random shock, (log) capital equals
its target in each period.  Suppose further that (=0 so that land is absent
from the production function.  Then :t=:=1 and 0=0, which implies that
k
*
t=yt-cKt: as in the standard neoclassical investment function, target (log)
capital equals the (log of the) ratio of output to the user cost of capital. 
When land is present ((…0), 0…0 and target capital also depends on the user
cost of land cLt, except in the special case when 2=1 so that production is
Cobb-Douglas in labor, capital and land.  The sign of the response of k
*
t and
thus of kt to an increase in cLt is determined by the sign of 0.  Since 0<:<1,
the sign of 0 matches that of 2-1.  When the elasticity of substitution 2 is
greater than one, Mk
*
t/McLt is positive: increases in the user cost of land
cause target capital and thus capital to increase.  When the elasticity is
less than one, increases in the user cost of land cause target capital and
capital to decrease.
When costs of adjustment are present (N…0), the instantaneous impact of
an increase in the user cost of land on k
*
t is as described in the previous
paragraph.  The long-run impact depends on the dynamic response of various
variables to the increase.  But an increase in cLt that is not associated with
offsetting or compounding changes in yt or cKt will cause k
*
t and thus kt to
increase if the elasticity of substitution 2 is greater than one, and decrease
if it is less.
Our empirical work relies on the partial equilibrium relationship just
derived.  We close this section with a brief outline of a general equilibrium
relationship between land prices and business investment.  The point we wish
to make is that when the elasticity of substitution between capital and land
is greater than one, an aggregate productivity shock that increases capital
will also increase the capital-output ratio.
Write the production function as Yt = F(Nt, Kt, Lt, At).  Assume that F is10
constant returns to scale in labor Nt and a composite of capital Kt and land
Lt, say Yt = AtG[Nt, X(Kt, Lt)].  Then the marginal product of capital may be
decomposed as
(2.13) FKt = (Yt/Kt) × (XtGXt/Gt) × (KtXKt/Xt) 
                = (output-capital ratio) × (share of capital and land in output) × 
(share of capital in combined income of capital and land)
Let us suppose that FKt is constant, as it is in a steady state of many
models, including Cass-Koopmans type models and small open economy models with
homogeneous goods.  Let us suppose as well that (XtGXt/Gt) is constant (G is
Cobb-Douglas in Nt and Xt).  Then we see from (2.13) that a rise in At will
cause a rise in Kt/Yt if and only if a rise in At causes a rise in KtXKt/Xt. 
This last condition holds when Lt is equal to the fixed supply of land and Xt
takes the constant elasticity form assumed above with an elasticity of
substitution 2>1.  For in this case, (KtXKt/Xt) = 1/[1+((L/Kt)
1-(1/2)]. 
Intuitively, when 2>1 a rise in total factor productivity leads to a larger
capital-output ratio because the constraint of a fixed supply of land is
mitigated by a larger capital stock.  On the other hand, when 2=1, so that G
is Cobb-Douglas in all three factors, the capital output ratio remains
unchanged after a rise in At.
 
3. DECISION RULE
Our empirical work considers a decision rule implied by the first order
condition (2.12).  We do not tie our estimation to the model we used to
rationalize (2.12).  Readers uncomfortable with the series of approximations
used to obtain (2.12) may prefer an alternative motivation:
2  Let a
representative firm minimize expected present discounted costs at a constant






2 - 2etkt, 11
a>0 a parameter, et an disturbance unobservable to the economist,
k
*
t/yt-ckt-0(ckt-cLt), 0>-1.  Then the first order condition to this problem is
(2.12), repeated here in a rearranged form as (3.1):
(3.1) Et[kt-kt-1 - a(k
*
t-kt) - b(kt+1-kt) - et] = 0.





t/yt-ckt-0(ckt-cLt) for a calibrated value of 0.  We
briefly report results for a bivariate VAR in which the second variable is
)k
*





t, )ckt and )cLt. (Given the linear relationship between )k
*
t, )yt, )cKt and
)cLt, all our results are unchanged if any three of these four variables are
included.)  Let Zt follow a first order VAR, 
(3.2) Zt = AZt-1+,t,
which appears to be consistent with the data.  Generalization to higher order
VARs is notationally complex but conceptually straightforward.  Deterministic
terms have been omitted for notational simplicity.
We obtain unrestricted estimates of (3.2) by OLS.  We use the estimates
to evaluate whether each of the variables substantially affects the other,
focusing on a basic implication of our model: since the decision rule for k t




t will Granger cause )k
*
t if firms forecast k
*
t
using more information than is in our VAR. 
We also obtain estimates restricted to accord with (2.12) as follows. 
We assume that the firm sees the variables in Zt, and that et is approximately
orthogonal to lagged Zt's.  (This seems consistent with the previous section's
model, insofar as small values for et imply a small correlation between et and
observable variables.)  Then (3.1) and (3.2) imply
(3.3) E[kt-kt-1 - a(k
*
t-kt) - b(kt+1-kt)|Zt-1]=0.12
Let "0/(-b,-b,0,0)', "1/(1+a+b,1,0,0)', "2=(-1,0,0,0)'.  Then (3.2) imposes the
restrictions implied by (3.3) if
(3.4) "0'A
2+"1'A+"2 = 0.
Our restricted system estimates A subject to (3.4), with an imposed value of b
(set to .95, in our annual data), using a technique described in the appendix
to Kiyotaki and West (1996).  
For both the restricted and unrestricted estimates, we transform (3.2)
into a VAR in the levels of yt, ckt, cLt and kt.  We compute impulse responses
of kt to the Wold innovations (one step ahead forecast errors) of y t, ckt, cLt
and kt.  These innovations, which in general are correlated with one another,
are linear combinations of the elements of ,t, the disturbance in (3.2).
To avoid confusion, we acknowledge that such innovations are not
fundamental objects with simple economic labels.  For example, the model of
the previous section indicates that to the firm the period t surprise in y t
will be a function of period t surprises in discount factors, wages, total
factor productivity and the user costs of capital and land.  In the VAR, the
one step ahead forecast errors will reflect as well information observed by
the firm but not by us--that is, the difference between E[.|Z t] and Et[.]
where "." is given in (3.3).  They will also reflect approximation error and
unobservable forcing variables that are collapsed into "e t".  Nonetheless we
will discuss the response of capital to "the" shock to y t, and to ckt, cLt and
kt.
4. DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
All data are annual, running from 1961 to 1995.  The starting point was
dictated by the desirability of using the call rate to construct the user cost
of capital.  The ending point was dictated by availability of capital stock
data when we first began this research in 1997.  The base year for real data13
is 1990.  We discuss in turn capital, output, user cost of capital and user
cost of land.  Since the first three are standard, we discuss them only
briefly.
The capital stock Kt is that of non-financial corporations, obtained
from sectoral balance sheet data on the Economic Planning Agency's Annual
Report on National Accounts, 1997.  Such corporations account for most of
private investment in plant and equipment.  The capital stock includes both
equipment and structures; a breakdown into the two types appears not to be
available.  Real data are available from 1969 to 1995.  Using a technique
similar to that described in Hayashi (1986) we used nominal data on the level
of the capital stock and on nominal gross investment (the "capital finance"
and "reconciliation" accounts) to construct the real data from 1961 to 1968. 
For this construction, we used the NIPA deflator for private investment in
plant and equipment.
We measured output as GDP.  The U.S. investment literature often uses
business output as the output variable.  In our earlier work (Kiyotaki and
West (1996)) we followed this tradition, using output of industry.  But a
small amount of experimentation suggested that results using GDP and output of
industry yield very similar results.  We focus here on GDP since its behavior
is both better appreciated and of more widespread interest.
Our construction of the user cost of capital follows our earlier work
(Kiyotaki and West (1996)), which may be consulted for details.  Briefly: We
have
(4.1) CKt = PIt
Pyt
C1KtC2Kt,





In (4.1), PIt is the price index for capital goods, measured as the NIPA
deflator for private investment in plant and equipment, 1990=100; P yt is the
output deflator, measured as the GDP deflator, 1990=100 (the ratio P It/Pyt
corresponds to the real price # PIt used in the model in section 2); Jt =14
effective corporate tax rate, computed from statutory maximum rates for
corporate, enterprise and local taxes as described in our earlier paper; z t =
present value of depreciation deductions per dollar of new investment, fixed
at .562 through the sample (.562 is the mean value for 1961-81 for the {z t}
series in Hayashi (1990, p338)); Et[PIt+1/PIt] is the fitted value of an AR(1)
in (PIt+1/PIt); * = depreciation rate, set at .10, which is approximately the
depreciation rate implied by the balance sheet data.  Finally, 1+i at = nominal
discount factor for the firm, computed as a weighted average of nominal return
on equity (weight = 0.6) and on debt (weight = 0.4).  Expected equity returns
were measured as the annual average of the call rate plus a constant risk
premium of 5 percent.  For 1992-95, the nominal rate on debt was set to the
annual average of the Bank of Japan series "average contracted interest rates
on new loans and discounts, long-term"; for 1961-91 the rate was set to the
annual average of the holding yield of long term bonds of the national
telephone company NTT plus a constant risk premium of 1 percent.
The final variable to discuss is the user cost of land.  Since this
variable is both non-standard (in contrast to the user cost of capital), and
involves some messy formulas, we discuss it in detail.  
The Japanese tax system imposes both a one-time tax on land acquisition
and a tax on land holding (which may vary with the amount of time the land is
held).  In equilibrium, the user cost probably is not well measured by the
cost entailed by a sale and repurchase each period. (It may help to point out
that the user cost of capital calculation does assume purchase and resale each
period.)  But formal modeling of an optimal decision to buy or sell would, it
seems, be quite complicated, and involve data that seem not to be available,
such as the length of time land is held.  We assume that land is sold
according to a Poisson process: there is a constant, exogenous per period
probability of sale of 8 that lies between zero and one.  This is a tractable
but admittedly crude way of capturing turnover in land holdings.
Specifically, let PLt be the nominal land price index, Jpt a tax on land
acquisition, Jht a tax on land holding.  Profit maximization implies that the15
cost of acquiring a unit of land is equal to the expected present value of the
profit:  













In (4.2), the symbols Pyt (output deflator), Jt (corporate tax rate) and iat
(nominal discount factor) are as defined in the discussion of the user cost of
capital. We have assumed for simplicity that the j-period nominal discount
factor is simply 1/(1+iat)
j. 
The first term on the right hand side of this equation is the expected
present discounted value of the after-tax marginal value product of land. 
This expectation reflects the fact that the land produces value only until the
firm sells the land: with probability 1-8 the firm will own the land in period
t+1, with probability (1-8)
2 it will hold it as well in period t+2, and so on.
The second term is the expected present discounted value of proceeds from
selling the land after paying tax on realized capital gains.  This present
value also reflects the exogenous process that determines sale of the land.
We assume static expectations about the growth rate of the price of
land: EtPLt+j=(1+iLt)
jPLt, where iLt is the nominal net expected rate of increase
of nominal land price, 1+iLt = EtPLt+j1/PLt+j, j$1.  We assume static expectations
about the levels of all other variables on the right hand side of (4.2).  So,
for example, Et[Pyt+jFLt+j(1-Jt+j)-Jht+jPLt+j] = PytFLt(1-Jt)-JhtPLt(1+iLt)
j.  Then
algebraic manipulations lead to
(4.3) FLt = PLt
Pyt
C1LtC2Lt,
  C1Lt =  1  
1-Jt










C23Lt = [Jt/(8+iat)] + [(1-Jt)(1+iLt)]/[iat+8(1+iLt)-iLt].16
The right hand side of (4.3), which we see is equal to the marginal product of
land FLt, is defined as the user cost of land Clt.
3  So
(4.4) CLt = PLt
Pyt
C1LtC2Lt,
   =  1
Pyt
×[tax-adjusted opportunity cost of owning a unit of land for one year]
It may help to indicate that in the absence of taxes,




){ 1 - [8(1+iLt)/(iat+8+8iLt-iLt)] }.
If, as well, 8=1 (sell and repurchase every period),
(4.6) CLt = PLt
Pyt
(1 -  1+iLt
1+iat
)
Since 1+iLt = EtPLt+1/PLt, our measure is now a familiar one (see (4.1)).
We measured the variables in CLt as follows.  The nominal land price
index PLt:  We tried two different indices.  We focus on an index supplied by
the Japan Real Estate Institute.  We use annual averages of the semi-annual
values of the index for the six largest cities.  (Since these indices use
median sale prices, it appears that the 6 largest cities provide a better
measure of the average increase in the value of land than does the index for
all urban districts.)  Following Auerbach and Ando (1990), we also constructed
an index from the EPA's balance sheet data for land for the nation as a whole. 
To do so, we set the 1990 value of our index to 100, the 1991 value to
100x(nominal value of land in the nation as a whole in 1991)/(nominal value of
land in the nation as a whole in 1990) = 100*(2231 trillion yen/2420 trillion
yen) . 92.2, etc.  The second index showed somewhat more rapid inflation.  But
since both gave similar results in our regressions, we limit our discussion
largely to results from the first index, presenting only a single set of
results from the second.
8: This was set to .10, implying the average period of time to hold a17
unit of land is 10 years.  This choice was largely arbitrary, although it was
influenced by a presumption that the tax surcharge for holding land less than
two or less than five years (not accounted for in our calculation above) would
lead to an average holding period longer than 5 years.
iLt: Conceptually, this is the expected rate of increase in land prices.
This was set to the annual average of the call rate, plus 2 percent.  The 2
percent premium reflects a risk premium minus the ratio of imputed rent on
land to the land price. (Because the realized rate of increase in land prices
is very volatile and often negative, attempts to use a proxy i Lt parallel to
that for Et[PIt+1/PIt] (i.e., a univariate autoregression) unsuccessfully led to
a number of very large positive and negative values.  Also, our proxy implies
a mean return lower than the historical mean.  But at some dates, some of the
present values in the computation of CLt fail to be finite if iLt: is set to
the call rate plus 4 percent.
4  This suggests that our static expectations
assumption is not very attractive, or that there are frictions that we have
yet to account for, or that the historical mean is above the mean as perceived
by private agents.)
Jpt: Set to 3.6 percent for the entire sample.  This variable reflects a
local tax of 4 percent of assessed value, a national registration tax of 5
percent of assessed value, and assessments that typically are around 40
percent of market value: .036 = (.04+.05)x.40.
Jht: Set to .68 percent for the years 1961-92, .8 percent for 1993-95. 
This variable reflects a local property tax of 1.4 percent of assessed value
and a city planning tax of 0.3 percent of assessed value: .068 =
(.014+.003)x.40.  In 1993-95, there was also a national land value tax of
.2-.3 percent of assessed value.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We discuss in turn: trends, and calibration of 0; unrestricted VARs;
restricted VARs and impulse response functions; robustness.18
A. Trends, and Calibration of 0
Figure 1 plots the levels of our four variables, capital K t, output Yt,
user cost of capital Ckt and user cost of land CLt.  During our 1961-95 sample,
all show trends.  Capital K grew by a factor of over 12 (top panel in Figure
1), output Y by a factor of a little under 6 (second panel).  The
capital-output ratio (not depicted) thus rose, from about .5 in 1961 to about
1.1 in 1995.
5  The third panel shows that the user cost of capital C kt fell; in
1995 it was less than half its 1961 value.  The fall is attributable to a
declining real price of capital goods (declining PI/PY), as discussed in
Kiyotaki and West (1996).  The bottom panel in Figure 1 show that the user
cost of land CLt rose; in 1995 it was about 2.5 times its 1961 value.  In
light of the well-known recent behavior of land prices, the behavior of C Lt in
the last 10 years of the sample suggests that a rising real land price (rising
PL/PY) is responsible for the rise in CLt.  Figure 2 illustrates that this is
in fact the case; net of the real land price, the user cost C Lt shows no
secular movement (bottom panel in Figure 2).
According to our model, kt-k
*
t = kt-[yt-(1+0)ckt+0cLt] is stationary, which
implies that its first difference has an unconditional mean of zero. 
(Reminder: 0 is defined in (2.11) as 0=(1-:)(2-1), with 0<:<1 the mean share
of capital income in income to capital and land, and 2>0 the elasticity of




(5.1) E[)kt-)yt+(1+0))ckt-0)cLt] = 0 ==>
0 = E()kt-)yt+)ckt)/E()cLt-)ckt).
In addition, since the trending components of ckt and cLt are real capital and
land prices, E)ckt=E)pIt-E)pYt and E)cLt=E)pLt-E)pYt, which implies that
(5.2) 0 = (E)kt-E)yt+E)pIt-E)pYt)/(E)pLt-E)pIt).19
Table 1 presents the growth rates of capital, output, and real capital
and land prices.  We present results for the entire 1961-95 sample, as well as
for the 1961-73 and 1974-95 subperiods, and for both land price indices.  Over
the sample as a whole, the capital stock grew at an average rate of 7.7
percent a year, GDP at 5.3 percent; the real price of capital goods fell 2
percent per year.  That implies that growth in 0(ckt-cLt) must have averaged
7.7-5.3-2.0 = 0.4 percent, if )kt-)k
*
t is to have mean zero.  For the sample as
a whole, the implied value of 0 is about .04-.05, using either of the land
price indices.  The means from the post-1973 period imply slightly smaller
figures.  The means from the 1961-73 data yield 0<0, implying an elasticity of
substitution 2<1.
We take the figures in the table to suggest a baseline value for 0 of
.05, but experiment with smaller values of 0$0.  (We do not attempt to
separately identify : and 2.)  Footnote 2 describes why we have a prior belief
that 0 is non-negative.
B. Unrestricted VARs
Table 2 presents the results of least squares regressions of first order
vector autoregressions, with k
*
t=yt-(1.05)ckt+.05cLt.  The table presents
coefficient estimates and asymptotic standard errors, together with standard
regression diagnostics.  Some details are in the notes to the table.
Columns (1a) and (1b) present ordinary least squares estimates of a




t).  In this and all regressions that include both
pre- and post-1973 data, we include a dummy set to one during 1974-95, as a
crude means of allowing for the general slowdown in economic activity that










t's, even though )k
*
t does not Granger cause itself.  In this and the other
regressions in the table, the Q- and Durbin-Watson statistics suggest that the
one lag is adequate.





t, )ckt, )cLt).  Columns (2a) through (2d) present least squares20
regression estimates.  The term kt-k
*
t continues to Granger cause )k
*
t relative










t-1, and )ckt-1 each have at least moderate predictive power.  Somewhat
disappointingly, the user cost of land )cLt-1 does not enter significantly into
any of these three regressions.  Column (2d) indicates that none of the four
lagged variables are statistically important for )cLt.
Columns (3a) through (3d) present results when the four variable VAR is
estimated using post-1973 data.  The point estimates change, although, as we
shall see when we present impulse response functions, they change in such a
way that the implied coefficients for a VAR in the levels of the variables are
quite similar in the full sample and post-1973 estimates.  The cost of land




t, and )ckt (columns
(3a), (3b), and (3c)), although )cLt continues to be unpredictable (column
(3d)).
C. Restricted VARs, and Impulse Response Functions
We next estimate VARs restricted to obey the cross-equation restrictions
written out in condition (3.4).  After so doing, we interpret the coefficients
by transforming them to a VAR in the levels of kt, yt, ckt and cLt and examining
impulse response functions.  This levels VAR has autoregressive unit roots. 
We focus on the impulse response of kt to movements in the one step ahead
forecast errors in this VAR.  As is typical for Wold innovations, these errors
are not orthogonal, a point that we emphasize merely to avoid confusion.
  In the restricted full sample estimates, the coefficients in the levels
VAR are
(5.3a) kt = 0.879kt-1+0.518yt-1-0.397yt-2-0.122ckt-1-0.005ckt-2+0.010cLt-1-0.004cLt-2 
-10.754-3.233dummyt + ^ v kt
(b) yt = 0.003kt-1+1.097yt-1-0.099yt-2+0.022ckt-1-0.019ckt-2+0.023cLt-1-0.023cLt-2 
+8.482-5.321dummyt + ^ v yt21
(c) ckt = -0.368kt-1-1.527yt-1+1.894yt-2+0.656ckt-1-0.042ckt-2-0.062cLt-1+0.081cLt-2 
-47.373-0.191dummyt + ^ v ckt
(d) cLt = 0.108kt-1+1.267yt-1-1.374yt-2+0.477ckt-1-0.364ckt-2+0.847cLt-1+0.148cLt-2 
+11.322+1.669dummyt + ^ v cLt
^ a = 11.0,
where "a" is defined in (2.2) and (3.1).  (Standard errors are not available.) 
The residuals "^ v .t" are linear combinations of the residuals of the VAR in
(k-k*,)k*,)ck,)cl).
Equation (5.3a) indicates, as one would expect, that the impact effect
on kt of an increase in yt-1 is positive (.518), that of ckt-1 negative (-.122),
that of cLt-1 positive (.010).  
The impulse responses are plotted in Figure 3.  The first column plots
the response to a 1 percent increase in ^ v yt (the residual in equation 5.3b
above), the second through fourth responses to a 1 percent increase in the
residuals ^ v ckt, ^ v cLt  and ^ v kt.  The rows plot the responses of yt (row 1), ckt
(row 2), cLt (row 3) and kt and k
*
t (row 4).  The response of k
*
t is computed as:
(response of yt) - (1+0)(response of ckt) + 0(response of cLt), with 0=.05.  The
scale on all the graphs is the same; note that in column 1 the period 1
response of cLt, the period 1 and 2 responses of ckt and the periods 1 through
5 responses of k
*
t have been truncated to fit in the graph.  We plot 10 years
of responses because the new steady state has been reached within 10 years.
Consider first the response to a 1 percent movement in ^ v yt, which is
shown in column 1. By construction the 1 percent period 0 shock to y t is
associated with zero change in the other three variables.  The period 1
response of yt is 1.097 percent > 1.0, reflecting positive autocorrelation in
the growth rate of yt.  The period 1 response of ckt is negative, of cLt, kt and
k
*
t are positive.  (The period 1 responses may be read from the coefficients on22
yt-1 given in equation (5.3): 1.097 for yt, -1.527 for ckt, 1.267 for cLt, .518
for kt.)  There are essentially no further dynamics in the response of y t,
which asymptotes with an increase of 1.11 percent.  The two user costs take
somewhat longer to reach steady state values, which for c kt is about zero, cLt
about .78 percent.  The response of k
*
t is a linear combination of these other
responses, and in the end is about 1.16 percent (= 1.11 - (1.05)x0 +
.05x(.78)).  Since the long run response of kt is that of k
*
t, the long run
response of kt is also about 1.16 percent.
The user cost of capital is mean reverting in response to its own
shocks, in the long run (10 years) rising .24 percent after the initial 1
percent rise (row 2, column 2).  The cost of capital shock evokes essentially
no response from yt, in either the next year or the long run (10 years).  The
cost of land rises by .477 percent, and asymptotes with a rise of .28 percent. 
In the long run, k
*
t and thus kt fall by about .22 percent.  
The user cost of land shows persistence in response to its own shocks,
responding in the long run to a 1 percent shock with a rise of .87 percent
(row 3, column 3).  The responses of yt and cLt are negligible.  Since 0=.05,
the long-run response of kt and k
*
t are approximately .05x.87 . .05 percent.
A shock to the capital stock causes ckt to move, but evokes little
response in either yt or cLt. 
It has long been noted that in investment regressions, capital responds
more strongly to output than to the cost of capital (e.g., Clark (1979)). 
This is the case with our data: in (5.3a), the coefficient on y t-1 is .518,
while that on ckt-1 is -.122.  The larger response has sometimes been taken to
suggest the desirability of modifying the model or estimation technique. 
While such modifications perhaps are warranted, a stronger response to output
is evidently not inconsistent with a neoclassical model: the coefficients in
(5.3) are constrained to accord with condition (3.4) and thus with the model. 
The intuition is as follows.  Column 1 of Figure 3 indicates that shocks to y t
tend to have persistent effects, with a 1 percent initial movement in y t
associated with a larger than 1 percent steady state movement.  Given the23
responses of ckt and cLt, this means that k
*
t will rise substantially in the long
run, which in turn implies that kt will also rise substantially.  Given costs
of adjustment, kt does not immediately leap to its new steady state.  But it
does rise a non-trivial amount.
On the other hand, column 2 of Figure 3 indicates that cost of capital
shocks are mean reverting, with a 1 percent initial movement in c kt associated
with a distinctly less than 1 percent steady state movement.  The target
capital stock k
*
t and the capital stock kt each change relatively little in the
long run, which implies an even smaller initial response.
6
While responses to the user cost of land have not been previously
analyzed to our knowledge, similar logic explains the pattern in column 3. 
Shocks to the user cost of land are largely permanent.  But the long run
effect on k
*
t and thus on kt is small since 0 is small (i.e., since the
elasticity of substitution [2] is near one and/or the share of capital income
in the total return to land and capital [:] is near one).
D. Robustness
Table 3 indicates that these results are robust to minor changes in
parameter values and data.  The leftmost set of entries in panel A (labeled
"0=.05") repeats the information in Figure 3.  One can see by comparing these
results to the middle set of entries that lowering 0 to .03 does not change
the results.  The rightmost set of entries in panel A illustrate that our
results are not sensitive to the land price index used.
Panel B indicates that when we use post-1973 data, the results are
quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged.  Panel C indicates that the
impulse responses from the unrestricted estimates are quite similar to those
from the restricted estimates that heretofore have been discussed.
Panel D gives the perhaps unsurprising result that the results change
little if we set 0=0.  Such a specification reduces the current model to one
used in our earlier paper (Kiyotaki and West (1996)).  When 0=0, the user cost
of land plays the role of an information variable, which can affect capital
indirectly through its ability to help forecast yt and ckt but otherwise does24
not affect kt.  
To be sure, land plays a slightly more important role when 0=.05 than
when 0=0.  One way to illustrate this is with a variance decomposition for k t. 
This is presented in Table 4.  The decomposition is computed from
orthogonalized innovations to the levels VAR (in contrast to previous tables,
which used non-orthogonalized innovations).  The orthogonalized innovations
are computed from a Choleski decomposition, with the variables ordered y, ck,
cl and k.  Both decompositions look similar.  But shocks to the user cost of
land are more important when 0=.05.  For example, at a 10 year horizon, these
shocks account for 13 percent of the variance of kt; the corresponding figure
is 9 percent when 0=0.
Our tentative conclusion is that while adding land to the production
function and thus to the definition of target capital leads to sensible
results, land price movements do not appear to play a particularly prominent
role in explaining movements in business investment.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In Japan, business investment tends to be strong in periods when land
prices are rising, and weak when land prices are falling.  To explain and
quantify the link between the two, we have proposed and estimated a
neoclassical model.  In the model, land and capital are both factors of
production.  Suppose the elasticity of substitution between the two is greater
than one.  Then anything that increases the user cost of land, such as
increases in land prices, will cause a substitution into capital, and thus,
all other things equal, will lead to strong business investment.  The converse
happens when a fall in land prices causes the user cost of land to fall.
We did not directly estimate the elasticity.  But a calibration did find
positive estimates of a related parameter "0" that is positive if and only if
the elasticity is greater than one.  Using the calibrated value, we found
estimates of the land-capital relationship that were plausible.  The25
quantitative effect of land on capital change was, however, small. 
Mechanically, this appears attributable to the fact that our calibrated value
of 0 is near zero, which is consistent with an elasticity only very slightly
above 1.
One priority for future research is to consider alternative measures of
capital, land, and capital and land prices, which might be consistent with an
elasticity distinctly greater than one.  Two examples: many authors have
commented on the difficulty of making sense of land prices in Japan (e.g.,
Ando and Auerbach (1990)), raising the possibility of problems with land price
data; our intuition suggests that the effect of land prices may be more marked
on structures than on equipment investment, yet our capital data and user cost
are for a composite of structures and equipment.  A second direction for
future research involves considering the effects of regulations, in particular
on land use.  A final direction involves considering alternative explanations
of the link between land and capital, including credit constrained models in
which land serves as collateral, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a, 1997b) and
Ogawa et al. (1996).26
1. This statement abstracts from creation or destruction of land by natural
disasters such as earthquakes or volcanoes, and from special projects such as
the bay area fill in that created the land underneath the Kansai airport in
Osaka.
2.We include ourselves among those not completely comfortable with the series
of approximations underlying (2.12).  This is in large part because both
theory and the data suggest trends that may not be well captured by our
approximations.  Theory: Consider a non-stochastic general equilibrium version
of our model, with aggregate land fixed at Lt/L, and with the elasticity of
substitution 2 greater than one.  Then the user cost of land CLt grows without
bound but sufficiently slowly that the share of land income (C LtL) in total
income falls to zero, with :t rising to 1: as in Jones and Manuelli (1990),
the fixed factor (in our case, land) asymptotically receives zero share of
national income.  This suggests that it may be misleading to approximate :t
around a constant, or perhaps even around a linear trend.  Data: Indeed, C Lt
displays an upward trend in our sample, as documented in section 5.
An unrelated point on the general equilibrium model: If continual
investment on physical capital is indispensable for sustained growth (as in
most endogenous growth models), then growth eventually ceases if, as well, the
elasticity of substitution is less than one.  For this reason, our prior is
that the elasticity is at least one.  
3. Suppose we assume static expectations about the growth rate rather than
level of Pyt.  Let L denote the lag operator. Then upon multiplying both sides
of (4.2) by {1-[(1-8)/(1+iat)]L
-1}, we obtain an alternate expression of (4.3):
FLt = (PLt/Pyt)C1LtC4Lt(1+Jpt+JhtC22Lt-8C23Lt), 
C4Lt = {(iat-iyt+8(1+iyt)/(1+iat), 
where iyt=Et(Pyt+1/Pyt)-1.  This is similar though not identical to (4.3).  We
have not investigated the sensitivity of our results to such alternatives.
4. This was the reason we did not measure 1+iLt = EtPLt+1/PLt with a univariate
autoregression, as we did for the cost of capital: the fitted values were
FOOTNOTES27
often very large, sometimes implausibly negative.
5.The ratio may seem small, in light of the stylized fact from growth theory
that the capital-output ratio is about 2 or 3.  But recall that the capital
stock here is just that of non-financial corporations.  If we add in
government and household capital the ratio is about 2.5.
6. Ueda and Yoshikawa (1986) earlier pointed out that the response of capital
depends on the time series properties of the variables it is responding to.28
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Growth Rates of Key Variables
  
1961-95 1961-73 1974-95
(1)K  7.7 12.2  5.1
(2)Y  5.3  9.1  3.4
(3)PI/PY -2.0 -3.2 -1.6
(4)PL/PY,  4.2  9.3  1.6
   PL=average land price, 6
    largest cities
(5)PL/PY,  7.2 13.5  4.9
   PL=balance sheet
    deflator for nationwide
    land
(6)implied value of 0, 0.053 -0.029 0.037
     from (1)-(4)
(7)implied value of 0, 0.037 -0.023 0.019
     from (1)-(3),(5)
1. Variables: K=real capital stock of non-financial corporations, Y=real GDP,
PY=GDP deflator.  The land price deflator in line (4) is the one used in most
of the empirical work.  The parameter 0 is defined in equation (2.11) in the
text.
2. Let gx denote the growth rate of a variable x.  For example, g K is 7.7
during 1961-95.  Then 0 is calculated as:
(gK-gY+gPI/PY) / (gPL/PY-gPI/PY).Table 2
Regression Results
Regressor     Dependent Variable
and            (1a)     (1b)        (2a)      (2b)      (2c)     (2d)          (3a)      (3b)      (3c)     (3d)
summary       kt-k*
t      )k*
t          kt-k*
t      )k* t      )ckt       )cLt          kt-k*
t      )k* t       )ckt      )cLt 
statistic
kt-1-k*
t-1  0.496    0.415        0.509     0.394    -0.368     0.108       0.387     0.558    -0.498     0.255
(0.146)  (0.150)      (0.145)   (0.141)   (0.144)   (0.278)     (0.170)   (0.161)   (0.172)   (0.350)
                                                                             
)k*
t-1 -0.098    0.074       -1.688     2.157    -1.894     1.374      -3.875     4.378    -4.083     0.655
(0.170)  (0.175)      (0.950)   (0.927)   (0.944)   (1.826)     (1.282)   (1.217)   (1.300)   (2.646)
                                                                             
)ckt-1                       -1.718     2.258    -1.947     1.808      -4.027     4.575    -4.244     0.962
                      (0.992)   (0.969)   (0.986)   (1.906)     (1.355)   (1.287)   (1.375)   (2.797)
                                                                             
)cLt-1                                0.019    -0.008     0.014    -0.217       0.289    -0.299     0.299    -0.117
                                     (0.110)   (0.108)   (0.110)   (0.212)     (0.170)   (0.161)   (0.172)   (0.350)
                                                                             
constant -82.8      81.2       -66.33     58.79    -47.37     11.32      -75.31     70.65    -59.59     36.87
(22.2)    (22.8)      (23.33)   (22.77)   (23.17)   (44.81)     (24.96)   (23.69)   (25.32)   (51.51)
                                                                             
post-1973  11.0     -17.0        1.891    -5.038    -0.191     1.669     
dummy  (4.5)     (4.6)      (6.771)   (6.609)   (6.727)  (13.008)    
                                                                            
$ R2  .493      .325        0.519     0.422     0.254    -0.041       0.419     0.556     0.447     -0.085
                                                                             
s.e.e.  11.4      11.7        11.09     10.82     11.02     21.30       10.486    9.955     10.639   21.644
                                                                             
Q-statistic                        3.83       3.76      1.86      2.49        1.78      1.86      1.47      3.48
[p-value]                       [0.87]     [0.88]    [0.98]    [0.96]      [0.88]    [0.87]    [0.92]    [0.63]
                                                                              
Durbin-  2.23      2.27        1.76       1.79      1.72      1.89        1.45      1.51      1.44      1.87    
 Watson
Sample period 1963-95 (33 obs.)               1963-95 (33 obs.)                         1974-95 (22 obs.)
Notes:
1. The table presents the results of ordinary least squares estimates of vector autoregressions with the indicated
variables.  Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.  "s.e.e." is the degrees of freedom adjusted estimate of the
standard deviation of the regression disturbance.  The degrees of freedom in the Q-statistic is 8 in specifications 1
and 2, 5 in specification 3.  The sample period that is given is for the dependent variable.2. k(t) is the log of the capital stock, ck(t) the log of the user cost of capital, cl(t) the log of the user cost of
land, k*(t) the target level of capital, defined as y(t)-(1+0)ck(t)+0cL(t), where y(t) is the log of output, and 0 is a
constant set at 0.05.  See text for further discussion.
3. The capital stock k is for nonfinancial corporations, output y is GDP, and the costs of capital and of land ck and cl
were constructed as described in the text.  All variables are real (1990 prices).Table 3
Response of k to a 1% shock, Alternative Specifications
A. Full sample estimates 
   alternative land
0=.05     0=.03   price measure, 0=.05
Horizon     Shock to:    Shock to:                  Shock to:
      y    ck    cl    k        y     ck     cl     k      y    ck    cl    k 
1    .52  -.12  .01   .88      .50  -.12    .01    .88    .38  -.11  .04   .88
10  1.15  -.22  .05   .75      1.12 -.22    .05    .76    .86  -.24  .09   .71
                                                            
B. Post-1973 estimates 
0=0.05     0=.03
Horizon     Shock to:    Shock to:
      y    ck    cl    k        y     ck     cl     k  
1    .63  -.05  .00   .95      .61    -.05   .00   .95 
10   .83  -.04  .02   .95      .84    -.05   .02   .94 
C. Unrestricted estimates, 0=.05
post-1973 sample     full sample    
Horizon Shock to:     Shock to:
      y    ck    cl    k        y    ck     cl     k   
1    .55  -.04  .02   .95      .55  -.05   .04    .91  
10   .84  -.05  .03   .91     1.09  -.17   .06    .77  
D. Estimates with 0=0
post-1973 sample     full sample    
Horizon Shock to:     Shock to:
        y    ck    cl    k        y    ck    cl    k
1    .57 -.04  .00   .95       .47  -.11  .01   .89   
10   .84 -.05  .01   .93      1.05  -.20  .04   .77   
Notes:
1. See notes to Table 2 and the text for description of the data.  The parameter
"0" is defined in equation (2.11) in the text.
2. The impulses are in response to 1 percent shocks to the one step ahead forecast
errors in VARs in (y,ck,cl,k); these shocks are not orthogonal.
3. The parameters of the VARs in (y,ck,cl,k) are computed from estimates of
underlying VARs in (k-k*,)k*,)ck,)cl).  Panels A, B and D present "restricted"
estimates, in which the underlying VAR parameters are restricted to obey equation
3.4.  Panel C is based on the unrestricted estimates presented in Table 3.  The
text does not directly present the parameters for the VARs underlying the
restricted estimates.  But for the full-sample, restricted specification, with
0=.05, the coefficients of the VAR in (y,ck,cl,k) are given in equation (5.3) and
the impulse responses are depicted in Figure 3.
4. In panel A, the last set of entries uses a different land price index to
construct the user cost of land.  This index is constructed from balance sheet
data on the nominal value of land in Japan as a whole.  See text for details.Table 4
Variance Decomposition of k, Choleski Decomposition 
  0=.05 0=0
        Percent of variance of  Percent of variance of
    k due to shocks to:   k due to shocks to:
Horizon y ck cl k  y ck cl k  
1       61 2 37 8  51 02 8 3
5 1 63 21 24 1 1 62 87 4 9
10  18 36 13 33 18 32 9 41
Notes:
1. All estimates are computed from a VAR in (y,ck,cl,k), whose parameters are
computed from the full-sample, restricted estimates with 0=.05.  The
coefficients of the VAR in (y,ck,cl,k) are given in equation (5.3).
2. The variance decomposition is computed from the orthogonalized innovations
to the VAR, with variables ordered as (y,ck,cl,k).  Note that the innovations 
therefore are not those whose impulse responses are depicted in Figure 3 and
presented in Table 3.
3. Totals may not add to 100 due to rounding.K




































 Figure 1Growth in cost of land


















Growth in remaining terms in cost of land








Figure 2Response of y to 1% shock to y











Response of ck to 1% shock to y











Response of cl to 1% shock to y











Responses of k and k* to 1% shock to y











Response of y to 1% shock to ck











Response of ck to 1% shock to ck











Response of cl to 1% shock to ck











Response of k and k* to 1% shock to ck











Response of y to 1% shock to cl











Response of ck to 1% shock to cl











Response of cl to 1% shock to cl











Response of k and k* to 1% shock to cl











Response of y to 1% shock to k











Response of ck to 1% shock to k











Response of cl to 1% shock to k











Response of k and k* to 1% shock to k
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Figure 3